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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ELDON E. RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

V

Case No.
8081

UNITED STATES STEEL COMPANY, a Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent has no serious dispute with the
statement of the case as made by Appellant, however
there are a few statements which should be clarified.
The introductory statement asserts that the claim of the
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Respondent was for an amount over and above the compensation established by an express contract. There is
no mention in the record which the Respondent can find
wherein there was ever any reference or discussion of an
express contract. It is assumed that at the time of initial
employment there was an agreed rate of compensation,
after which periodic raises were paid to Respondent,
There was no mention or reference to any specfic discussions concerning the rate of pay after the initial
employment. The Respondent is not therefore attempting
to recover in the face of an express contract agreed upon
by the parties fixing the rate of pay; but rather, it is the
Respondent's contention that there was only one contract
and that was an implied in fact contract to the effect that
the Respondent would receive, in addition to the amount
currently paid, retroactive payments to be determined
after the completion of the job reevaluation study hereinafter mentioned.
The first paragraph at top of Page 2 of the Appellant's brief refers to a distinction between employees
located in what they call the plant area as contrasted
with general office employees, and further states that
those employees within the plant were all represented
by labor unions and therefore their terms of employment
were dictated by negotiated contracts with the union.
There was one group of salaried employees similar to
general office employees, working in the plant area not
represented by a labor union for whom a job evaluation
program was completed and payments were made in
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identically the same manner as payments were made to
those who were represented by the unions. (E. 71)
The second paragraph on Page 2 of the brief states
that the job evaluation program was commenced as a
result of an agreement with the CIO and various subsidiaries of the United States Steel Co. Exhibit P - l and
Exhibit P-14, Page 33, as published in the United Steel
News, the official publication of the defendant company,
states that the job evaluation or inequity study was
ordered by the National War Labor Board in November,
1944. The job evaluation program as discussed in said
exhibits was established to accomplish the following:
" 1 . Describe simply and concisely the content of each job
in the bargaining unit; 2. Place the jobs in their proper
relationship; 3. Reduce the job classifications to the
smallest practical number by grouping those jobs having
substantially equal content; and 4. Eastablish appropriate rates and methods of pay for the job as grouped
within their respective job classifications." As explained
in Exhibit P-l the program in addition to the above
mentioned objectives was set up to eliminate inequities in
pay scales between positions within the same subsidiary
wherein the position called for comparable skill and
training, and also to eliminate inequities as between subsidiaries where the position required employees to do
substantially the same or comparable work. How the
program was to be conducted and carried out is explained
in detail in said exhibits.
The program at the Geneva Plant was first completed as to the wage and hourly workers in the mill and
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thereafter was applied to two groups of salaried
employees in the mill; one group represented by a bargaining unit and the other group of salaried personnel
not represented by a bargaining unit. Thereafter the
program was conducted as to the salaried employees in
the general office. (E. 66-68) There was only one difference in the general operation of the program as it
applied to the four groups of employees. According to
the Appellant, general office employees were required to
be on the payroll on the effective date of the program.
As to the other three groups of employees this requirement was not specified and upon application the
employees would receive their retroactive pay even if
they had terminated their employment with the company. (E. 72)
The contention of the Eespondent was that there
had been a usual practice and custom to grant to nonunion employees the same or comparable pay benefits
at or near the same time as benefits were awarded to
union employees. Two regular salary incerases were so
received by the Eespondent during his course of employment until the date of July 16, 1948. (E, 51) At that
time in announcing a pay increase, mention was made
of the job evaluation program to be applied to nonexempt salaried personnel comparable to the program
commenced for the wage and hourly employees. (Ex. P-3)
No further increase of a general nature was granted to
any group of employees until December 1, 1950 (E, 136),
approximately two and one/half years after the
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announcement in July, 1948. It was the Respondent's
contention that based upon the custom and implications
of the job evaluation program the employees were led to
believe and to rely upon the assertions that retroactive
pay would be made to them at the completion of the
evaluation program.
Since the first point relied upon by the Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon, a
more detailed examination of the evidence in support of
the Respondent's claim will be made in the argument.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
There is substantial competent evidence of an implied
contract to the effect that the Appellant would pay to
Respondent retroactive pay as determined by the job evaluation program.
POINT TWO
The court did not err in admitting evidence of acts by
the company subsequent to November, 1950, nor did the
court err in giving instruction No. 10 pertaining to evidence
of acts of the employer subsequent to November, 1950, at
which time plaintiff's employment had ceased.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
There is substantial competent evidence of an implied
contract to the effect that the Appellant would pay to
Respondent retroactive pay as determined by the job evaluation program.
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Although the Appellant recognized the elementary
rule that in an appeal from a jury's verdict the evidence
must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the
Respondent, Appellant thereafter proceeds to review and
emphasize the evidence most favorable to the Appellant.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the evidence
most favorable to the Respondent is as follows:
The first witness called by the Respondent was
James L. Dillon, Superintendent of Industrial Relations
for the Appellant during the time in question. (R. 59)
He testified that he had been with the Appellant and its
predecessor Corporate Organization since the inception
of its operations as a steel plant in the State of Utah.
(R. 60) In connection with general pay increases to
union and non-union employees Mr. Dillon testified as
follows:
"Q.

You were then with the plant almost from
the time of its inception ?
A. From the time it started operations.
Q. From the time it started operations, and during that period of time were pay increases
given—put that, were general pay increases
granted Union employees, and non-Union
employees at or near the same time?
A. Yes.
Q. Were those pay increases, although not actually the same, were they comparable, and corresponding anywhere near to the pay increases granted Union Employees!
A. Yes.
Q. Has it been the policy of the Company,
through the period of time that you were
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there, to grant general increases, and we have
discussed both as to time and comparable in
amount, to employees, whether they were in
Unions, or not in Unions?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remeber, or know, of any instance
when that policy or procedure was not followed?
A. No, I don't recall any particular instance
where it was not followed." (R. 60-61)
Mr. F. Ray Priedley, who had been with the Appellant and the predecessor companies since the commencement of operations in 1944, was Assistant Comptroller
until June 30, 1950 and thereafter was the comptroller
of the Appellant was called as a witness. Mr. Friedley,
as chairman of the salary administration committee,
which committee had the direct supervision and jurisdiction over the job evaluation program, testified concerning the custom of the company as it applied to pay
increases for union and non-union employees as follows:
"Q. Now, during the period of time that you were
there, had the company usually granted pay
increases or pay benefits—by that, I mean
general increases to non-union employees on
the same basis, or a comparable basis of time
and percentage, as they had to union
employees?
A. So far as the dates are concerned, that is correct, so far as the rates of pay or general
increases are concerned, they would differ,
of course.
Q. They will differ in exact amounts to any one
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

employee, but the general, all-over increase
was just about the same, was it not?
Well, general increases being related usually
to cost of living increases, yes, the treatment
would be similar.
Has that been true of all of the time you have
been working with that company?
That is correct.
Do you know of any instance where that did
not generally follow?
Now, you are referring to general increases,
of course?
Yes, general increases?
Again, I will state, so far as the dates are
concerned, I know of no exceptions to that,
and so far as my statement on amount, there
would be no exception to that." (R. 97, 98)

Mr. Torvall Nelson, an employee of the Appellant
in the engineering department and classified as a general
office employee, commenced working for the company on
December 2,1946 and was still working with the company
at the time of trial, testified as to a general custom as
follows:
"Q. During that period of time up to the present
time, would you say there is a policy, general
procedure or custom in respect to making
general pay increases? Answer "yes" or
u

nn"

*****

A. Yes.
Q. I used a lot of terms, custom, policy, procedure, what would you call it in your own
words, the plan we are talking about?
A. I would say it was customary.
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Q. Well, what is customary ?
A. For instance, the hourly people would receive
a blanket increase, sometime following that,
maybe two or three weeks, by the general
office personnel would receive an increase
somewhat similar to it.
Q. Would it usually be effective as to the same
date, the hourly increase was granted, and
announced late on ?
A. Usually earlier.
Q. The amount received, how would you describe
that?
A. Similar.
Q. Has that always been the case?
A. Since I came to work there, it always has
been more or less an established procedure."
(R. 126)
Alton Sumsion, an employee in identically the same
department in which the Respondent worked, was called
as a witness and testified concerning the custom of the
Appellant in connection with pay increases as follows:
"A. Usually, or as far as I know always when a
bargaining unit has negotiated an increase,
a similar increase has also been extended to
the salaried people.
Q. That is true to all types of pay benefits, is
that right?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you receive your retroactive pay for that
period of time ?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did you report that as wages earned, did
you?
A. Yes." (R. 132)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Respondent likewise testified as to the existence
of the custom mentioned above. (R. 126)
The Respondent commenced working for the Appellant or predecessor on January 20, 1947 (R. 136) and
thereafter received a general increase as did all of the
employees whether union or non-union on April 1, 1947
and July 16, 1948. (R. 51) Thereafter the Respondent
did not receive any general pay increase from said date
in July, 1948 up until the time of terminiation on November 30,1950. (R. 136)
In connection with the pay increase made effective
July 16, 1948, an announcement was made as follows:
"Nonexempt Salaried Personnel
All salaried employees classified as nonexempt under the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and members of plant personnel
shall receive a salary increase effective July 16,
1948, amounting to $17.00 per month, representing the monthly equivalent of 9%^ minimum
hourly rate increase granted wage earners. A
salary rate inequities program will be undertaken
with respect to said nonexempt salaried positions
comparable to the inequities program recently
completed for wage earners. An increase increments cost comparable to that granted wage
earners will be reserved for distribution through
retroactivity of the salary rate inequities program
for the period commencing July 16, 1948." (Ex.
P-3) (Emphasis added).
Although the Appellant does not challegen the fact
that the Respondent was a non-exempt salaried person-
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nel, it contends that this notice did not apply to the
Respondent since it was addressed to all plant department heads. Attention is called to the notice which states,
"All salaried employees * * * and plant personnel * * *".
If the notice was only to apply to employees in the plant
it would seem unnecessary to make the distinction cited
above. The reference to plant personnel cannot be construed as applying to non-salaried employees, since the
notice announces the salary increases as being the
equivalent of 91/2^ minimum hourly rate increase granted
to wage earners. Both the Eespondent and the witness
Torvall Nelson, who worked in the general office in the
engineering department, testified that they had seen the
announcement and, since they were non-exempt salaried
personnel, understood the announcement as applyig to
them. (B. 128) That such a program was discussed in
1948 and 1949 as to general office employees was verified
by Mr. Dillon, Superintendent of Industrial Relations.
(R, 77) The purported distinction between the plant and
general offices will be further discussed in argument of
the next point.
The announcement of the pay increase and the job
evaluation program contained in the letter of August 3,
1948 referred to the job evaluation program which had
been completed as to wage and hourly mill employees.
(Ex. P-3) On June 25, 1948 a joint news release was
made to the public press which stated that back pay to
mill employees at the Geneva Plant would be paid in the
near future and that the retroactive date was determined
as March 9, 1947. (Ex. P-2)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
Mr. Dillon testified that the first activity in connection with the job classification program was commenced as it applied to the Geneva Plant in 1947 and was
made effective on April 18, 1948. (R. 66) Thereafter a
similar program was commenced as to salaried employees
in the mill in the fall of 1948 but that this program was
discontinued temporarily when some of the employees in
that classification affiliated themselves with a bargaining unit or labor union. However, the program was carried on after the employees were unionized and was
finally made effective November 19, 1950. (R. 66-67)
The program as it applied to general office employees
commenced in September, 1950; the job classifications
were approved and completed in March, 1951; and the
program was put into effect on June 3, 1951. (R. 50, 69)
It was explained that there were only so many industrial
engineers who could work and complete the pob descriptions and thereafter the accounting department had to
compute the retroactive pay based upon the new job
classifications, and due to limited help only one program
could be carried on at a time.
In July, 1950 an announcement was made in the
Provo Herald that clerical workers at Geneva would have
placed in effect as to their positions a program similar
to the one which had previously been applied to the
hourly workers positions. (Ex. P-4) In the July, 1950
issue of the United States Steel News reference was made
to the job inequity program as it was initiated in 1944
pursuant to a directive of the National War Labor Board
which defined in detail the purpose and mechanics of
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the program and further stated, "other employees will
receive increases, part of which are amounts set aside
and not heretofore paid to them when general wage
increases were negotiated in 1948." (Ex. P-14 Page 33)
It will be recalled that in the letter dated August 3, 1948
after announcing the inequity program it stated an
"increased increments cost comparable to that granted to
wage earners will be reserved for distribution through
retroactivity of the salary rate inequities program for
the period commencing July 16,1948." (Ex. P-3)
The Respondent some time prior to October 17,
1950 was asked to prepare a job description of the particular position which he held. (R. 142-143) Thereafter
a copy of the job description as prepared by the industria engineers was submitted to the Respondent for his
approval. The Respondent testified that the initials ERR
in the upper right hand corner on Exhibit P-9 are his
initials placed there by him. (R. 142) On November 27,
1950 the final approved job description was prepared.
(Ex. P-10)
x\s stated in the Appellant's brief and at the time of
pre-trial and as urged before the jury at the time of trial,
it was their contention that the company policy required
that an employee to be elgible for retroactive pay in the
general office had to be on the payroll on the effective
date of the evaluation plan. (R. 72) It will be noted that
as to all other employees, union or non-union, and even
as to non-exempt salaried employees not represented by
the union in the mill, retroactive payments were made
whether said employees were on the payroll on the effec-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
tive date or not. (R. 72) In support of this contention the
Appellant introduced Exhibits D-15 and D-16 being letters to the various department heads advising them that
as to non-exempt salaried employees a general increase
was being granted and that a job evaluation program
was under way which provided for retroactive pay back
to March 9, 1947 and which further provided that it
would apply only to employees on the payroll. It should
be noted that this letter is dated December 15, 1950, two
weeks after the Respondent had left the employment of
the Company. It is the Respondent's contention that an
implied in fact contract, based upon the prior custom and
upon the publications and notice of the job evaluation
program, had been formed by his continuing to work
since August 3, 1948 with knowledge of such custom and
publications, and that the contract could not subsequently
be modified by the unilateral action of the company by
specifying an additional requirement not heretofore
involved in connection with the prior three reclassification programs. The letters announcing such a requirement were intended to be a statement of an interum policy
policy and were superceded when the policy and procedural mannual was finally issued which defined in
particular the "former employees" who would be entitled
to receive pay. (R. 112) The Policy and Procedural
Manual, Exhibit P-12, issued June 1, 1951, effective June
3, 1953, paragraph 6 entitled "Lump Sum Payments" for
the retroactive period provided as follows:
"Lump Sum Payments for the Retroactive Period.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.1 For the purpose of Paragraph 6.3 below,
the term "employee' shall mean an employee on
the payroll of the Company, or an affiliated Contract Company of United States Steel Company,
on the date the standard salary scale becomes
effective who since March 9, 1947, worked on a
job covered by this Policy. A "qualified former
employee" as determined by the Salary Administration Committee, shall be eligible for retroactive lump sum adjustments who: (a) since
March 9, 1947, worked on a job or jobs covered
by this policy; but (b) is not on the payroll of
the Company or an affiliated Contract Company
of United States Steel Company on the date the
standard salary scale becomes effective; and (c)
files individually signed request for individual
lump sum payment in writing with the Company
on or before August 17,1951."
It will be noted that no place in this requirement is
it stated that to be a "qualified former employee" the
applicant must be on the payroll on the effective date.
The very term being defined "qualified former employee"
and caluse (b) indicates that the applicant would not be
on the payroll on the effective date. It was further testified that the policy procedural manual adopted by the
Geneva Steel Company was patterned after a policy
procedural manual of the United States Steel Corporation of Delaware and that manual was used as a guide
for the adoption of the manual for Geneva Steel. (B, 86)
The same numbered paragraph on the same subject matter from the policy procedural manual of the Delaware
corporation states as follows:
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«##***an(j ^ e ^ e r m ^q Ua iifi ec i former employee"
shall be understood to mean an individual (except
an individual who quit or was discharged) who:
(a)" (emphasis added).
Thereafter comparable provisions to the (a), (b), and
(c) requirements contained in the Geneva Procedural
Manual are set out. It is obvious that the manual of the
Delaware Corporation specifies the requirement asserted
by Appellant. But it is equally obvious that the salary
administration committee at Geneva in adopting the provisions for their own manual excluded that provision
from the manual. It was the Respondent's contention
therefore that the company did not intend to prohibit
former employees from receiving their retroactive pay.
To further show that it was the company's intention to
treat non-exempt salaried employees either in the general
offices or in the mill as well as union employees on
identically the same terms, the Respondent submitted
Exhibit P-7 being a news -release from Mr. L. J. Westhaver, Geneva Vice-President and Manager of Operations wherein he announced that salaried clerical and
technical employees of the Geneva Steel Company who
worked in plant areas other than the headquarters offices
would receive their checks for retroactive salary payments, and then he stated:
"similar retroactive payments are to be made at
some future date for similar workers in the headquarters offices of the plant."
Exhibit P-5, a notice placed on the bulletin boards, after
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announcing retroactive pay for salaried employees represented by the union, both as to employees on the payrolls
and for employees who had terminated their employment
stated:
4

Salary rates and retroactive pay of nonexempt salaried employees of the Geneva Plant
not subject to the bargaining unit will be established and computed in the same
manner."
(emphasis added)
Exhibit P - l l is a worksheet prepared by Geneva
Steel Company entitled "Salary Inequities" which sets
forth the respective weekly pay periods in which the
Respondent worked for the Appellant and shows the rate
of pay which he was paid and the rate of pay which the
position under the new classification should have been
paid for the particular period of time. I t is from this
exhibit and computation sheet that it was calculated that
the Respondent if he were entitled to the retroactive pay
would have received the sum of $1,574.17. I t is obvious
from this computation as well as from the fact that it
is classified as wages and pro-rated during the respective
years for tax purposes that the computations were made
on the basis of wages earned and that the amount paid
was not a mere gratuity as often contended by the Appellant.
In Powell et al v. Republic Creosoting Co., 19 Pac.
2d 919, 172 Wash. 155, the Respondent sued the Defendant company for an additional amount owing for services
rendered. It appeared that the Respondent had been an
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employee of the defendant company for a period of years
and during that period of time he had received, in addition to his base salary, a substantial bonus averaging an
amount from 25% to as high as 63% of his stated salary.
The Respondent resigned his position on December 1,
1930 and was suing to recover a proportionate share of
a bonus comparable to an amount paid the preceding
year.
The Respondent contended, and the trial court held,
in effect that the course of dealings was sufficient to
constitute an implied contract between the Respondent
and the Appellant that the Respondent should be compensated in addition to his regular salary by an adjustment at the end of each year. The court in affirming the
judgment stated as follows:

.'.?;

"It does not necessarily follow that the total
compensation earned by the respondent in 1930
must equal or exceed the total in 1929, because
results were a factor to be taken into consideration each year in determining the value of
respondent's services. The appellant might have
pleaded and proved, if such were the fact, that
respondent's services resulted in less profit to
the company in the last year, or even that the
profits of the company fell off without fault on
the part of any one, thus making the business as
a whole less prosperous, less able to pay, less
profitable to its stockholders and all concerned,
and of course the services of every one connected
with it would under those conditions be less valuable than in the years of prosperity. Nothing of
this kind was even suggested in the pleadings or
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hinted at in the testimony. On the contrary, it
was shown that other branch managers received
larger bonuses in the year 1930 than they did in
the year 1929.
"Respondent relies upon the case of Scott v.
J. F . Duthie & Co. 125 Wash. 470, 216 P. 853, 28
A. L. R. 328, and similar authorities. Appellant
argues that these cases are based upon express
contracts and are therefore not applicable here.
We are not advised that implied contracts differ
in any degree from express contracts in the requirements as to mutuality and consideration.
Here, as in the Scott Case, we can find both mutuality and a sufficient consideration to support
the contract
"As early as 1919, by conduct which was thereafter continued, the employer began to hold out
to the employee the offer or implied promise that,
if he would continue in the service (which he was
not otherwise required to do), his compensation
would be adjusted annually on a basis of reasonable value. The employee accepted the offer by
continuing in the service; hence there was mutuality and a consideration moving to the employer just as in the Scott Case, supra. In discussing this question, it was there said: 'The
promise here was therefore no "nudum pactum"
on that theory, nor is it one on the theory that the
promise was one for additional pay to be given
one already under contract to do the very work for
which the additional pay was promised. The argument that the appellant cannot recover the bonus
for the reason that he was paid his regular salary
while in the respondent's employ overlooks the
very idea conveyed by the Avord "bonus", which
is "an allowance in addition to what is * * * stipu-
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lated." Standard Dictionary. The complaint
shows that the appellant was free to quit his work
at any time, and therefore was under no obligation
to do the thing which the respondent was seeking
to accomplish by its offer. The compliance with
the terms of the offer created a contract supplementary to the contract of employment. By this
supplementary contract the respondent agreed to
reward the appellant for remaining in its employ
and refraining "from accepting employment elsewhere until this company shall complete the
ships."'
"We conclude, therefore, that the trial court
did not err in holding that respondent was entitled to compensation in the year 1930 at the same
rate as was received in the year 1929.
"The judgment is affirmed."
An Annotation entitled, "Requisites as to definiteness of agreement to pay employee share of profits" in
18 A. L. R. 2d 211 states as follows:
"The authorities make it clear that the question of whether a profit-sharing agreement, uncertain in that it fails to set forth the extent of
the employee's share, is sufficiently definite to
bind the employer is not susceptible to rule-ofthumb solution. On the contrary, although the
courts uniformly recite the rule that contracts
must be definite, the compliance or noncompliance
with this rule by an individual promise by an employer to share profits with his employee is most
often, if not always, determined from a consideration of all surrounding facts and circumstances.
And the courts have shown a tendency to grant
recovery, if that can possibly be done, to an em-
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ployee who has proved the making of the profitsharing promise and who has acted in reliance
thereon.
"Illustrative of the tendency mentioned above
are the cases treated herein which the courts have
held that the test of definiteness is met where an
employer promises to pay his employee a share of
profits from a particular enterprise, or a 'fair and
equitable share' of profits, or up to, but not to
exceed, a specified percentage of profits, as well
as those in which by reference to the employer's
earlier practices certainty has been found in the
share to which the employee is entitled. It has
also been suggested that an apparently indefinite
profit-sharing agreement can be rendered sufficiently definite by consideration of the agreement
in light of custom applicable to the parties."
One of the cases annotated in the above cited annotation is Snyder v. Hershey Chocolate Co. (1916) 63 Pa.
Super Ct. 528. In this case the company had been accustomed to paying the employees a share of its profits.
In holding that the plaintiff could enforce payment of a
share of the profits, the court states:
"We may assume that the payment of the
additional wages was dependent upon the success
of the business and that there was no absolute
promise to pay a definite sum contained in the
letter above referred to. What amount was to be
distributed was to be determined by the board of
directors. It was certain that the workmen were
to have a share in the profits, if any were made.
This was the inducement to the men to continue
in the company's employ. In other words, the
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promise was that at the end of the year there
would be some distribution of profits, if any were
made, and after the company fixed the amount
which was to be distributed, then that which was
indefinite became definite and all the laborers
employed by the company who had taken employment under the promises to share if they continued to work during the year, were entitled to receive their extra compensation fixed at 20 per
cent of their wages during the year. The company
offered this as an inducement to the laborers to
continue in its employ and this purpose being consummated by a fixing of the amount of the extra
compensation, all the elements of a valid contract
were present."
The Appellant in the present case should not be
heard to complain that the contract cannot be enforced
because of indefiniteness. The Respondent maintained
that there was a definite contract to pay him retroactive
pay when the job classification program was completed
in such amount as the classification would determine
should be paid for the position which he held. He does
not now challenge the computation of this amount as
contained in Exhibit P-ll. It is assumed that the industrial engineers acted in good faith in arriving at the
classification assig;ned to the position held by Respondent. The fact that the amount which would be paid Respondent could not be ascertained at the time of the formation of the contract does not invalidate the contract
if the procedure to be followed is sufficiently detailed
and after the classification has been made the amount
then can be readily ascertained. Exhibit P-l, being ex-
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cerpts from the publication of United States Steel News,
states six steps which shall be followed and explains in
detail how the reclassification program will be conducted.
The respondent, according to his contract, could only
insist that the program be followed in good faith as outlined. If as a result of the reclassification, it developed
that the position he held was being overpaid, he could not
complain. On the other hand, if it developed that the
position he held should have been paid an additional
amount, he was entitled to receive retroactive pay compensating him for this differential. The contract was
definite from the beginning; the amount became definite
after the completion of the program. The Respondent
has never challenged or contested the amount as computed in Exhibit P-ll by employees of the Appellant.
In an annotation entitled, "Right of employee to
bonus as affected by termination of employment before
bonus becomes payable", in 28 A. L. R. 346 it is stated
as follows:
u

In the absence of special considerations, it
seems reasonable to hold, as several of the cases
cited below do hold, that assuming that there is a
valid and enforceable promise through the offer
of a bonus and acceptance by the employee's continuing in the service, if the employment is terminated by mutual consent of the parties or by the
act of the employer through no fault of the employee, the latter should be entitled to a proportionate share of the bonus, according to the time
served, even though there was no time fixed for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the duration of the employment, and it could,
therefore, be terminated at will."
In this case the Respondent worked for the Appellant
the entire period for which retroactive pay was to be paid,
namely from March 9, 1947 to December 1, 1950. There
was no attempt to impose a time limitation with which the
Respondent must comply to be entitled to the retroactive
pay until after the expiration of this period. More particularly, December 15, 1950 (Ex. D-15 and 16) was the
first time any mention was made that an employee to be
eligible for retroactive pay would have to be on the payroll on the effective date of the new classification. As
contended by the Appellant, to which the Respondent
could not object, and as the court instructed the jury,
no fact or circumstance after December 1 could be considered in connection with the formation of the contract
or the terms thereof,,
The only case cited by the Appellant in support of
their position is the case of Pyeatt v. El Paso Natural
Gas Company (N. Mex. 1950) 213 Pac. 2d 436. This case
merely affirmed the trial court's holding that under the
facts there presented there had been no reliance upon the
offer made by the company. More particularly, the court
stated that the employee had not continued working for
the company in anticipation of any wage increase, but
rather that the employee had purchased a farm and it
was his intention to only remain with the company until
such time as it was necessary for him to operate the farm
the following year. The offer to the employees was a conditional offer only, to the effect that they would receive a
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pay increase if approved by the War Labor Board. The
condition was not performed until after the employees
had terminated their employment with the company. The
most that can be said about this case is that it affirmed
the holding of the trial court which had made an adverse
decision on the facts to the employees there involved.
The rule there established should likewise be followed in
this case and the finding of the jury should now be affirmed.
In an annotation in 100 A. L. R. 969 at 985 the general rule, without citation of dissenting authority, is
stated as follows:
"Where the existence of a contract is to be
made out, if at all, from evidence of the acts of the
parties and surrounding circumstances, as construed in connection with informal writings, and
where, from such acts and circumstances opposite
inference may be drawn as to the existence of
some fact essential to the contract, a jury question
is presented."
It is respectfully submitted that the court properly
permitted the jury to determine whether the facts and
circumstances in this particular case were sufficient to
establish an implied contract between the parties. The
jury having determined this factual issue in favor of the
Respondent, it is manifest from the testimony in the
above-entitled action that there was more than sufficient
competent evidence to justify the determination of the
jury.
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;

POINT TWO

The court did not err in admitting evidence of acts by
the company subsequent to November, 1950, nor did the
court err in giving instruction No. 10 pertaining to evidence
of acts of the employer subsequent to November, 1950, at
which time plaintiff's employment had ceased.
The Appellant in Points Two and Three urges that
the court erred in admitting certain exhibits and evidence
of facts and circumstances which occurred after December 1, 1950. Such evidence was stated to be Exhibits P
7-13 inclusive. The record discloses that the Appellant
only objected to the introduction of one of these exhibits.
As to Exhibit 8, a letter of April 2, 1951 to the government requesting authority to adopt the retroactive plan,
no objection was made to the admissibility of that document, (R. 94) In fact, the Appellant relied upon the language contained in the document in support of its contention. (R. 114) Nor was any objection made to the introduction of Exhibit P-9 (R, 143), Exhibit P-10 (R. 94),
Exhibit 12 and 13 (R. 96) and apparently Exhibit P-ll
was received by stipulation. (R. 61) Furthermore Exhibit P-9 was dated October 17, 1950 and was a copy of
a job description submitted to the Respondent for his
approval while he was working for the company. Exhibit 10 was dated November 27, 1950, also during the
term of the employment of the Respondent. If the other
exhibits dated after December 1, 1950 are immaterial,
then so are the Appellant's exhibits D-15 and D-16, both
dated December 15, 1950. These exhibits are the letters
upon which the Appellant rests in defense that emDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ployees had to be on the payroll on the effective date of
the program in order to receive retroactive pay.
Only one of the exhibits specified in the argument
of this point was objected to and that was Exhibit P-7
and part of the objection to that exhibit was that it was
irrelevant and immaterial since it did not apply to the
general office except as follows: "Similar retroactive
payments are to be made at some future date for similar
workers in the headquarters officers of the plant," This
statement was also claimed to be immaterial since it was
stated by counsel for Appellant that there was no issue
concerning the same. If there had been no issue as
claimed by the Appellant on this question, the matter
might have been irrelevant and immaterial, but the very
claim of the Appellant that the Respondent had to be an
employee on the payroll on the effective date shows that
a similar program was not being applied to the general
office employees since that requirement had not been
specified as to any other group of employees. It was the
Respondent's contention that this document was material
to aid in the construction of the requirements placed in
the policy procedural manual relied upon by the Appellant and to show by the company's own construction it
was its intention to apply identically the same program
to the general office employees. The other part of the
Objection made to this one exhibit was that it occurred
more than four months after the plaintiff had quit. The
court to guard against any possible assertion that this
document could be used as part of the foundation for an
offer made to the Respondent instructed the jury in In-
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struction No. 10 as follows: "You are instructed that in
determining whether defendant made an offer to plaintiff
to make a retroactive adjustment you are not to consider
any statement or act* made or done after December 1,
1950; * * *"
The Appellant on appeal objects for the first time
to the introduction of Exhibit P-8, a letter which it relied
upon as specifying the requirement that the employee
had to be on the payroll. The Kespondent introduced this
document to identify Exhibit P-5 which was a notice
placed upon the bulletin boards for the employees of the
company to inspect. This notice announced the completion of the program as to salary workers in the mill and
specified that retroactive payments would be made to
March 9, 1947. The notice further specified that former
employees would receive their retroactive pay and then
stated, "Salary rates and retroactive pay of non-exempt
salaried employees of the Geneva Plant not subject to the
bargaining unit will be established and computed in the
same manner." It will be noted that this paragraph says
at the Geneva Plant. A pencil indication on the bottom of
said notice states, "Posted in each plant on bulletin board
for a period of one week commencing on or about December 1, 1950." As has been previously stated the Appellant takes the position that when referring to the Geneva
Plant they are talking about the operations inside of the
fence and not the general offices. However, in its letter
to the government dated April 2, 1951, Exhibit P-8, it is
stated that a retroactive pay program had been com-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
pleted for non-exempt salaried personnel at the Geneva
and Ironton Plants and that as part of the overall program,
"it was our intention to apply a similar inequity
study to the non-exempt personnel who are within
the general office group, which would include also
non-exempt salaried personnel at the quarry and
the coal mines."
"A notice was posted on or about December
1, 1950 throughout the general locations in which
these groups of employees are working advising
them that such a program would be inaugurated
and placed into effect at the earliest possible time,
a copy of this notice is attached."
It was admitted that Exhibit P-5 was the notice referred to in the letter of April 2, 1951 and by the terms
of that letter it distinctly states that this notice was placed
on the bulletin boards where it could be observed by employees in the general office group. It is therefore obvious that the company as well as employees have used
and understood the term "Geneva Plant" to refer to the
entire operations located at what is known as Geneva,
Utah or the steel plant in Utah County.
Exhibit P-7, the only exhibit of the above group
which Appellant objected to at the trial, is material to
rebutt this alleged distinction. In this Exhibit Mr. L. J.
Westhaver is quoted as follows: "He said similar retroactive payments are to be made at some future date for
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similar workers in the headquarters offices of the plant"
(italics added)
Since the Appellant at the trial stated there was no
objection to the introduction of the fore-mentioned exhibits, except as to Exhibit P-7; since Exhibit P-7 was
admissible for independent reasons not connected with
the making of an offer by the company; and since the
court instructed the jury not to consider any statement or
act made or done after December 1, 1950 in determining
if an offer had been made, the Appellant cannot conscientiously maintain that the court erred in this regard.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant may feel that it is proper to attempt
to deny the claim of the Respondent even though it must
recognize that the Respondent did not receive a general
pay raise for a period of approximately 2 and % years
while the job evaluation program was being conducted
and even though it has received the benefit of the employee's labor during that period of time. The Appellant
may also feel that it is proper to belittle the claim of
the Respondent and to flippantly treat it and classify it
as was done in their brief as, "confusion, confusion, confusion." Mr. Heald, executive secretary of the company
and associate general counsel, stated, "it was our determination that the company would receive the most
benefit from such a program by applying the program
to employees of the company, not former employees of
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the company, those gentlemen were gone and presumably had left the company for reasons sufficient for
themselves." Considering the long period of time from
July 16, 1948, when the program was announced, to J u n e
3, 1951, when the program was made effective, and the
number of employees who had terminated employment
with the company, it can readily be seen how "the company would receive the most benefit" from attempting
to cut off retroactive pay to such employees.
It is respectfully submitted that the Respondent was
justified in relying upon the custom acknowledged by
the head officers of the company to the effect that all
employees would receive comparable pay benefits. He
was justified in believing that as soon as time would permit, the classification program would be applied to the
general office employees. All communications indicated
that the program would be identical. It was common
knowledge that the program was being carried out. Not
until December 15, was any communication made which
would indicate that there would be a new and different
requirement which would be applied to general office employees. At this time it is submitted the contract had been
formed and could not be unilaterally modified. It is further submitted that when the company finally adopted
the plan and put it into effect on June 3, 1951, as specified in the Policy Procedural Manual, it specifically deleted any such requirement by not following either verbatim or in substance the guide as set out in the Policy
Procedural Manual of the Delaware corporation, which
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included such a requirement.
submitted that, viewing the
favorable to the Eespondent,
the judgment entered thereon

It is therefore respectfully
evidence in the light most
the verdict of the jury and
should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
DAN S. BUSHNELL,
Attorney for Respondent.
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